merits in mathematics and physics have taught us nothing else, they have at least taught us not to take too seriously the descriptions of space and spatial relations which science and common sense have rendered.

If it is now pretty well agreed among high authorities that the Euclidian-Newtonian descriptions of space are inadequate to the reality ; and this should give us pause when we find ourselves demanding that every acceptable factor of the real world must be describable in spatial terms.

The recent progress in parapsychology (referred to on page 235) teaches the same lesson, namely, how utterly inadequate to the realities are the conventional ways of conceiving spatial relations. The relations we perceive and conceive as spatial are no doubt real relations of real things ; yet perceived and conceived by us in very inadequate and perhaps distorted fashion. The mere fact that in our perceiving of spatial relations we are subject to a wealth of varied illusions should have been a sufficient warning against taking too literally any of our spatial representations.

If biologists would only bear in mind this undeniable inadequacy to the realities affecting all our spatial thinking, they would be less hampered, less tied down to ill-founded dogmas about space and causation and the limits and nature of scientific exploration.

Let them consider that if we had no faintest knowledge of anatomy and physiology; if, like Aristotle, we believed that the brain serves merely to cool the blood, we should

still be able to build up a true science of psychology (or of human behaviour) based upon observation, experiment, inductive generalization, and verification. We should be able to construct and gradually improve and enrich a